Charting New Waters: China’s Role in the Arctic Fisheries Agreement and Arctic Research

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Marco Volpe at the 10th China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC) Symposium in April 2025 at Tongji University, Shanghai, China. Photo: Marco Volpe

The Arctic Institute China Series 2025

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The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA) was signed in 2018 and entered into force on June 25, 2021, after the ratification of all ten parties. It includes the five Arctic coastal States plus China, Japan, Korea, Iceland and the European Union. The Agreement will remain in effect for 16 years, with the possibility of renewing it in increments of five years. During this time, the parties have agreed not to authorise any commercial vessel flying the national flag to conduct any commercial fishing in the area of 2.8 million km². Most importantly, the Agreement is intended to ensure that adequate scientific knowledge informs the decision-making process to explore the viability and sustainability of commercial fishing in the Agreement area. To better understand the marine ecosystem, fish stocks, and ecological linkages and the potential impact of the commercial fishery in the Central Arctic Ocean on indigenous people, the parties have agreed to establish a Scientific Coordinating Group (SCG), which is charged with the Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring (JPSRM) to fill these information gaps.

Through the creation of Working Groups, the principal goal of the JPSRM is to provide meaningful advice to the Conference of the Parties (COPs) regarding the management, sustainable use, and conservation of marine living resources in the CAO. The work of the JPSRM is developed into two different phases: the mapping phase will be carried out in two or three years to understand the baseline condition, evaluate different approaches, research ethos and system of knowledge used during the monitoring phase; the monitoring phase will identify temporal variability or trends in species distributions or ecosystem productivity.

As a signatory member, China committed to actively engaging in generating and obtaining data that will support decision-making work. In the last two decades, the impressive advancements of China’s Arctic technological and scientific research has positioned the country among the most productive actors in terms of Arctic science. From 2000 to 2024, there has been a five-fold increase in Arctic science-related publications, which prioritised the CAO and the Gakkel Ridge area.¹⁾Landriault M (2024) Chinese scientists are increasingly shaping the future of the Arctic amid China’s rising presence. The Conversation, 5 June, https://theconversation.com/chinese-scientists-are-increasingly-shaping-the-future-of-the-arctic-amid-chinas-rising-presence-230509. Accessed on 22 October 2025 Establishing permanent research observing infrastructure and conducting research expeditions almost yearly, China can offer a precious contribution in this framework.

This article examines China’s growing involvement in the creation and implementation of the CAOFA, situating it within China’s broader Arctic research program and identifying the areas in which China can make distinctive contributions. In doing so, it reflects on the uniqueness of the Agreement as a collaborative platform at a time of intensifying great-power tensions.

China’s Journey Through the CAOFA: Path and Significance

During the past two decades, China has systematically enhanced its scientific and technological presence in the Arctic, thereby laying the groundwork for its contributions to several domains within the CAOFA framework.

The first phase of the Agreement negotiation led to the Declaration Concerning the Prevention of the Unregulated High Seas Fishing on the CAO, better known as the Oslo Declaration. The Oslo Declaration signed in July 2015 takes the form of “soft law” by the Arctic 5 to regulate high seas fishing in the CAO and calls upon the implementation of appropriate interim measures to deter unregulated fishing in the future in the high seas portion of the CAO.²⁾Liu D (2017) The 2015 Oslo Declaration on Arctic High Seas Fisheries: The Starting Point Towards Future Fisheries Management in the Central Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Yearbook 2017, https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2017/Scholarly_Papers/21_The_2015_Oslo_Declaration_on_Arctic_High_Seas_Fisheries.pdf. Accessed on 1 January 2026 The Icelandic disagreement on the A5 format (which includes only the five Arctic states) influenced the progress of the negotiation that culminated in the A5 + 5 format, enlarging the participation to China, Japan, Korea, Iceland and the European Union.³⁾Vylegzhanin A.N., Young O.R., Berkman, P.A. (2020) The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement as an element of the evolving Arctic Ocean Governance complex. Marine Policy 118, 10400 Scientific meetings on CAO fish stocks began in Anchorage in 2011, with China joining the process for the first time at the third meeting in Seattle in 2015. The final statement from the third meeting openly stated that “other States may have an interest in this topic and looked forward to a broader process involving additional States beginning before the end of 2014”.⁴⁾NOAA (2015) Final Report: Third Meeting of scientific experts on fish stocks in the Central Arctic Ocean. Third Meeting of Scientific Experts on Fish Stocks in the Central Arctic Ocean. Accessed on 5 June 2025 China and Asian engagement within the process has been developed through a parallel exercise defined as the “Asia Dialogues” which consisted in four different meetings: The Roundtable on Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries issues held in Shanghai in 2015; one meeting in Incheon in Korea in 2016; a working session on “an international marine science coordinating organization in the Central Arctic Ocean” and a one-day workshop on the “implementation for the Agreement to prevent unregulated High Sea Fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean in Korea in 2018.⁵⁾Harrison, P., Shin, H. C., Huntington, H. P., Balton, D., Benton, D., Min, P., Fujio, O., Guo, P., Grebmeier, J, M., Highleyman, S., Jakobsen, A., Meloche, M., Romanenko, O., & Zilanov, V, K. (2020). How Non-Government Actors Helped the Arctic Fisheries Agreement. Polar Perspectives, 2

China’s participation in the Agreement mirrors also its enhanced role within Arctic governance. The Agreement does not distinguish between Arctic and non-Arctic states, assigning equal rights and duties with respect to the ban and the necessity to conduct scientific research. Equal status granted in the Agreement represents a step up from the observer status of the Arctic Council.⁶⁾Huntington H. and Pan, M (2024) China-U.S. cooperation in the Arctic Ocean: Prospects for a new Arctic exceptionalism? Marine Policy 168, 106294 At the international level, being recognized as a reliable partner represents a major step for China, helping to ease the concerns of many Arctic stakeholders regarding its ambitions, particularly following its 2018 self-definition as a ‘near-Arctic state’ in its official Arctic policy. Domestically, it responds to what many Chinese academics have described as the limited influence China has had in the Arctic Council as an observer.⁷⁾Volpe M (2023) High Seas Triggering Arctic Security? An Analysis of Chinese Academic Discourse on the Central Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Yearbook 2023, https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2023/Scholarly_Papers/19_Volpe_AY2023.pdf. Accessed on 1 January 2026

The opening up to a new governance model that includes and provides equal status to non-Arctic states might even create room for reconceptualising Arctic exceptionalism. Setting aside the limits of Arctic exceptionalism exposed by the Ukraine war, a renewed exceptionalism rooted in international scientific research cooperation could arise through strengthened collaboration among China, the US, and Russia under this governance framework.

CAOFA as the Space for a Science-Rooted Exceptionalism? China’s Involvement and Potential

Since CAOFA entered into force in 2021, four COPs have been held. The April 2024 adoption of the Implementation Plan constituted a key advance in enabling the Agreement to take effect and deliver results. Appendix 12 of the report of the CAOFA third COP illustrates the organization: the COPs work as the decision body, the SCG supervise the work carried out by the different working groups: Mapping and monitoring working Group (MM-WG), Data Management working Group (DM-WG), Working Group on Exploratory Fishing (EF-EG) and Website Working Group.

Through Working groups, Chinese fishery scientists have provided relevant expertise, which has been refined by other scientists from other signatory nations. Dr Wu Lizong from the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) shares the chairmanship with Dr Robert Foy of the Data Management Working Group.⁸⁾Shan Y. & Lin H (2024) Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement: China’s role and implications for sustainable Arctic governance. Advances in Polar Science. Vol. 35(4): 473-481

The Implementation Plan lists activities and provisions that highlight the impact that China can have on the implementation process.

Every state has its own national research plan that sets national research priorities and activities carried out over a certain period of time. The Implementation Plan calls for coordination of national programs: the SCG “will promote coordination between national programs […] and requests to provide plan and schedule at least six months prior to commencement of research activities”.⁹⁾NOAA (2024) Implementation Plan of the CAOFA Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring. Third Meeting of Scientific Experts on Fish Stocks in the Central Arctic Ocean. p.36. Accessed on 21 October 2025

China’s national research program has been consistently developed over the last years. This year, China completed its 15th Arctic research exploration, which involved four different research vessels: Xuelong 2, Jidi, Shenhai 1 and Tansuo 3. The expedition advanced the understanding of rapid changes in the Arctic Ocean through marine environmental surveys and signed the first manned deep-sea dive in Arctic ice-covered waters with the Jiaolong submersible.¹⁰⁾Zhao L (2025) China concludes 15th Arctic Ocean scientific expedition. China Daily, 26 September, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202509/26/WS68d69107a3108622abca3345_1.html. Accessed on 22 October 2025

In the early years, Chinese Arctic scientific expeditions focused on the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas off Alaska, while most recently they have been targeting the Gakkel Ridge area.¹¹⁾Laujenesse A (2023) PRC’s 13th Arctic expedition creating concerns for Russia. The Watch, 7 October, https://thewatch-journal.com/2023/10/07/prcs-13th-arctic-expedition-creating-concerns-for-russia/. Accessed on 22 October 2025 The Gakkel Ridge is a prominent submarine feature located to the east of the North Pole. It represents the boundary between the Eurasian and North American Plates, which features hydrothermal vents and seamounts much like its faster-spreading southern continuation, known as the Mid-Atlantic Ridge.

Within the framework of CAOFA, China participates regularly and typically sends stable, recurring delegations. At the 4th COPs meeting held in Tromsø in June 2025, China’s delegation consisted of eight people. China presented the document on Suggestions on Issues Pertaining to Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (VMEs) Under the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, which encouraged the COPs to rely on practices of United Nations, FAO, RFMOs in respect to the scope of application, definition and identification of VMEs.¹²⁾NOAA (2025) Fourth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, p. 14, https://vlab.noaa.gov/web/caofa. Accessed on 22 October 2025

In the last SCG meeting held in Hafnarfjörður in Iceland in March 2025, the Chinese delegation was made up of ten members, including people from the PRIC, universities, research institutes and the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration. China presented the document entitled Proposals for Implementing the Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring which reported the findings from one of the Chinese Antarctic Research Expeditions (CHINARE) in the Chukchi Shelf/Plateau Areas. China recommended “the SCG to expedite the implementation of the JPSRM including […] organizing and conducting joint scientific investigations to produce scientific data on the priority elements and parameters closely relevant to the aim and scientific questions of the JPSRM and […] coordinate the investigation plan to facilitate the mapping and monitoring of the key elements in the priority areas”.¹³⁾NOAA (2025) Report of the Third Meeting of the CAOFA Scientific Coordinating Group, p.10, https://vlab.noaa.gov/web/caofa. Accessed on 22 October 2025 China also proposed to host the in-person SCG 4 meeting in 2026.

In the interim meeting of the CAOFA SCG held online in November 2024, China’s delegation counted thirteen members. The SCG noted that China is planning a comprehensive survey in the CAO that could be utilised for the JPSRM.

Chinese icebreakers Xue Long and Xue Long 2 are included in the icebreakers that can be used to conduct joint scientific research in the CAO waters to supplement data collected by the dedicated mapping and monitoring programs. China started using its domestically built icebreaker Xue Long 2 from its 11th research expedition in 2020. The vessel is 122.5 meters long with an ice-breaking capacity of 2-3 knots average speed in 1.5 m of ice with 20 cm snow cover. The vessel is owned by the PRIC and represents a game-changer for China’s capability to navigate polar waters. China purchased the Xue Long from Ukraine in 1994. It was designed as an ice-strengthened cargo ship, not fully satisfying the demands of China’s polar national program.¹⁴⁾Brady A.M. (2017) China as a great Polar Power. Cambridge University Press

The novelty of the CAOFA rests on the inclusion of Indigenous and traditional knowledge alongside scientific input. The Agreement recognizes Indigenous knowledge as a distinct source of information operationalized by Articles 4(4) and 5(1)(b) of the Agreement which impose obligations to the COPs to review and take into account of Indigenous Knowledge.¹⁵⁾Molenaar E.J. (2024) The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement and Arctic Indigenous peoples. Marine Policy Vol. 164, 106160 The inclusion of Indigenous knowledge in the research and monitoring program is a concept relatively new to Chinese researchers but well developed in North America.¹⁶⁾Pan M Huntington H (2025) What if? “Strategic Competition” vs. “Selective Cooperation” The Arctic Institute, 14 October, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/what-strategic-competition-selective-cooperation/. Accessed on 21 October 2025 The SCG recognises the importance of coordinating with Inuit organisations and communities to coordinate action and facilitate communications between the SCG and the Inuit regions. At the 3rd SCG Meeting of the CAOFA, the representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) presented Indigenous knowledge strengths conceptualised as holistic, a representation of collective knowledge passed over many generations, embedded with Inuit cultural values and not often recognised in scientific research. As one important step towards a deepened reciprocal understanding between the Indigenous knowledge system and China’s scientific engagement, in April 2025, an event titled Marine Living Resources Cooperation and Governance: A Roundtable Discussion on Further Cooperation in the Central Arctic Ocean was held at Tongji University in Shanghai, gathering Chinese and visiting scholars, including Arctic Indigenous peoples. The discussion highlighted the necessity to keep cooperating in the Arctic amid geopolitical tensions and the JPSRM provide a remarkable example; the developing governance with the CAOFA and the BBNJ provides space for discussing adequacy of governance mechanisms of the CAO; the participation of the Inuit and other Indigenous People is key in the process of harmonising Indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge.¹⁷⁾Pan M and Huntington H (2025) Prospects for Further International Cooperation in the Central Arctic Ocean: Report of a Roundtable Conference at Tongji University, Shanghai Arctic InfoNorth, Vol. 78 (1), p.105-107

The meeting included a presentation of Indigenous science, with a particular focus on Beluga monitoring in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR). This work is led by the Fisheries Joint Management Committee, which develops management programs for fish and marine mammal populations and their ecosystems by applying both sound scientific knowledge and Indigenous Knowledge of the ISR’s freshwater and marine resources and their habitats.

Conclusion

In an era of renewed great power rivalry and weakening global governance, the CAOFA stands out as one of the few areas for constructive international cooperation despite widening geopolitical fractures. As the most recent Arctic-related legally binding instrument to include non-Arctic actors on an equal footing, the CAOFA introduces a model in which responsibilities and rights are shared on the basis of scientific contribution rather than geography.

For China, the Agreement has been both a platform and a potential catalyst. By participating as an equal party, China gains institutional recognition as a responsible and cooperative Arctic actor. More importantly, the Agreement’s scientific mandate aligns with China’s consistent investments in polar research infrastructure and expeditions, enabling China to convert scientific capacity into diplomatic legitimacy. In a period when Western-Russian scientific cooperation is severely strained and when US and European budgets face constraints, China’s sustained research program gives it both an incentive and a unique means to shape future governance outcomes in the CAO.

Equally innovative is the Agreement’s operational recognition of Indigenous knowledge. The obligation to integrate Indigenous knowledge not as a symbolic gesture but as an epistemic input to research design and decision-making represents a conceptual turning point in Arctic governance. As community-based and indigenous knowledge integration is a comparatively new experience for many Chinese researchers, the process entails a degree of epistemic adjustment but also facilitates the development of mutual trust with Indigenous collaborators and Arctic publics. The CAOFA therefore serves as a rare example in contemporary geopolitics: a domain where scientific cooperation, Indigenous participation, and preventive governance intersect under conditions of equality between Arctic and non-Arctic states and stakeholders.

Marco Volpe is a Visiting Researcher at the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland.